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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Justin Samuel Goetsch pleaded guilty to one 
count of sexual abuse of a child. The district court imposed a unified sentence of 25 
years, with 15 years fixed. On appeal, Mr. Goetsch asserts that: (1) the district court 
violated his right to due process by punishing him for exercising his constitutional right 
to conflict-free counsel at government expense; (2) the district court abused its 
discretion when it imposed his sentence because it used, as a factor in sentencing, the 
fact that appointment of conflict counsel cost the county additional money; (3) the 
district court abused its discretion when it denied his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 
(hereinafter, Rule 35) motion because there was new information presented that was 
misinterpreted and not adequately considered; and (4) the district court abused its 
discretion by imposing an excessive sentence. 
The State argues that Mr. Goetsch has failed to prove that his constitutional 
rights were violated or that the district court abused its discretion because it is not clear 
from the record that the district court sentenced him vindictively when he exercised his 
constitutional right to conflict-free counsel, and that his exercise of that right did not 
affect the outcome of the proceedings. The State also asserts that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion when it considered the extra cost of conflict counsel at 
sentencing, and when it denied Mr. Goetsch's Rule 35 motion, because the district court 
was correct when it stated that Mr. Goetsch tried to blame someone else for his crime. 
And, even if this was not his strategy, his exercise of his right to conflict-free counsel 
proves that he did not accept responsibility for his crime. 
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However, all of these arguments depend on the premise that the district court 
could, at sentencing, reveal and consider the contents of a document (the DePew 
affidavit) that was filed under seal for the sole purpose of demonstrating that 
Mr. Goetsch's public defender had a conflict of interest. This was a basic violation of 
due process. Even if considering that sealed document for something other than its one 
purpose was allowed, the fundamental error is clear from the record because the district 
court considered impermissible factors; this permeated its entire analysis, and even ran 
to its order on Mr. Goetsch's Rule 35 motion. The use of such an affidavit for 
sentencing purposes has the potential to chill the entire pre-trial process. It could 
discourage other clients from considering various trial strategies with their attorneys, 
and it could discourage attorneys from following the ethical rules and bringing a conflict 
of interest to the attention of the court for fear that the court will use that information 
against their client. 
Further, the State's arguments depend on accepting that the district court 
correctly perceived that Mr. Goetsch was considering trying to blame someone else for 
committing the offense instead of considering a strategy that would have expounded on 
the idea that the accusation against Mr. Goetsch was the result of trauma from a 
completely separate crime. The State also asserts that even if the district court 
misinterpreted the strategy revealed in the DePew affidavit, the district court acted 
correctly because the affidavit revealed that Mr. Goetsch was not accepting 
responsibility. It is clear, however, that the facts do not support the State's assertion. 
Other than a potential strategy that was ultimately abandoned and was only disclosed in 
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the affidavit to allow Ms. DePew to withdraw, there is absolutely nothing in the record 
that indicates Mr. Goetsch did not accept responsibility for this offense. 
The State also argues that the Bateman affidavit was submitted with the Rule 35 
for the purpose of challenging or discrediting the DePew affidavit. The reality is that it 
was submitted to clarify the situation that created the conflict of interest in the first place 
and to address the district court's statements at sentencing that the DePew affidavit 
demonstrated that Mr. Goetsch tried to blame someone else for his crime. In other 
words, there was no need for a "credibility determination" with respect to the Bateman 
affidavit; it simply clarified the DePew affidavit and offered more evidence that the 
district court's conclusions were not correct. Thus it is certainly reasonable to conclude 
that the district court did not understand the strategy that Mr. Goetsch initially 
considered but never pursued. But again, it should not have been considered as a 
sentencing factor in the first place. All of this demonstrates that Mr. Goetsch's Rule 35 
should have been granted. Therefore, the State's arguments fail. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Goetsch's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUES1 
1. Did the district court violate Mr. Goetsch's right to due process by increasing his 
sentence because he exercised his constitutional right to conflict-free counsel at 
government expense? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it considered, as a factor in 
sentencing, Mr. Goetsch's exercise of his constitutional right to conflict-free 
counsel which cost the county additional money? 
3. In light of the affidavit from Jenny Bateman that directly addressed and 
discredited a factor that the district court considered at sentencing, did the district 
court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Goetsch's Rule 35 Motion? 
1 Apppellant is not replying to the issue of whether the district court abused its discretion 
when it imposed his sentence because the State's reply is not remarkable. Accordingly, 




The District Court Violated Mr. Goetsch's Right To Due Process By Increasing His 
Sentence Because He Exercised His Constitutional Right To Conflict-Free Counsel At 
Government Expense 
A. Introduction 
Despite the State's claim that the record is unclear, the totality of circumstances 
shows that the district court did sentence Mr. Goetsch vindictively, and the violation of 
due process is clear from the record. Mr. Goetsch exercised his constitutional right to 
conflict-free counsel. His attorney then filed an affidavit under seal, and the district 
court considered that affidavit for an impermissible purpose. 
8. Mr. Goetsch Met His Burden Of Establishing Fundamental Error Because It Is 
Plain And Obvious From The Record That The District Court Intended To Punish 
Mr. Goetsch For Exercising His Constitutional Right 
The State concedes that the first prong of the fundamental error test is satisfied, 
as Mr. Goetsch asserts that the district court increased his sentence because he 
exercised his constitutional right to conflict-free counsel. (Resp. Br. p.6.) But the 
State's reliance on State v. Baker is misplaced because the entry of an Alford plea, the 
subject of Baker, is not a constitutional right, and the right to conflict-free counsel is.2 
153 Idaho 692, 698 (Ct. App. 2012). 
First of all, an Alford plea is taken in a public, open-court proceeding. By 
contrast, it is common knowledge that an affidavit filed under seal, for the sole purpose 
of describing a conflict of interest so that an attorney can withdraw from representation, 
is a document that is not made available to the public or opposing counsel, and should 
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only be used for its intended purpose. While a defendant's refusal to accept 
responsibility can be used as a sentencing factor, a sealed affidavit regarding attorney 
representation should never be used to establish that a defendant is not accepting 
responsibility. As stated in Mr. Goetsch's Appellant's Brief, the district court's use of the 
document was contrary to long-established United States Supreme Court precedent 
that "punishing a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a 
due process violation of the most basic sort .... " Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 
357, 363 (1978); accord North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), overruled on 
other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 
21 (1974). Moreover, a finding to the contrary would discourage future defendants or 
attorneys from bringing potential conflicts of interest to the court's attention and thereby 
lessen compliance with the Constitution and ethical rules. 
Unlike in Baker, the fundamental error in this case is clear from the record. The 
Court in Baker explained that the defendant's situation there was different than when a 
defendant asserts a right to a jury trial and is subsequently sentenced vindictively. Id. at 
695. The Court said that "a defendant has no 'right' to enter an Alford plea, and it is 
within the trial court's discretion whether to allow and accept such a plea." Id. at 696. 
The Court went on to state that "the authority Baker cites to this Court does not 
unequivocally show the entry of an Alford plea is akin to exercising the right to trial that 
would preclude a trial court from increasing a sentence based on the defendant's choice 
of how to proceed in a criminal case." Id. Here, in stark contrast, exercising the right to 
2 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
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conflict-free counsel is akin to exercising the right to trial, as it obviously concerns the 
defendant's exercise of a constitutional right. 
Further, unlike the situation in Baker, the district court here never stated that it 
was concerned that Mr. Goetsch's exercise of his right to conflict-free counsel 
demonstrated he was not accepting responsibility. In Baker, the Court of Appeals 
specifically noted that the district court "spoke of acceptance of responsibility ... " when 
discussing the Alford plea. Baker, 153 Idaho at 695. Here, there is no indication from 
the record that the district court discussed the contents of the sealed affidavit with the 
intention of showing that Mr. Goetsch was not accepting responsibility. In fact, nowhere 
in the district court's discussion of the sentencing factors it considered does the court 
even use the phrase "acceptance of responsibility" or anything similar. (See R., pp.39-
41.) Despite this, the State says, without factual support, that the court "appropriately 
considered" Mr. Goetsch's strategy disclosed in the affidavit "as evidence he was not 
accepting responsibility." (Resp. Br. p.8.) In reality, after the district court discussed its 
concern over the timing of Mr. Goetsch's offense, but before it mentioned that this was a 
"second sex crime," it just inserted the following statement: "Also, the court also notes 
that during the pendency of this action it was necessary to appoint a conflict public 
defender because of the assertions, either by you or other family members, that 
perhaps there was another person who committed this crime." (Tr., 6/25/12, p.41, Ls.4-
9.) 
The only way the district court could have reached this conclusion was as a 
result of reading, and misinterpreting, the DePew affidavit. In fact, it went on to say that 
"[c]ertainly, the defense of this crime has resulted in the additional cost to the county. 
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That is a factor, but a very minor factor for the court to consider." (Tr. 6/25/12, p.41, 
Ls.10-13.) Nothing in that statement suggests that the court used this as evidence 
Mr. Goetsch was not accepting responsibility. Indeed, given that the district court never 
mentioned a concern about acceptance of responsibility, it appears as though it was 
simply displeased by the proposed strategy revealed in the DePew affidavit, and the 
amount of money and time it cost to provide Mr. Goetsch with conflict-free counsel. 
The State also argues that the second prong of the fundamental error test is not 
met, again relying on Baker, because the defendant there could not prove the error was 
clear from the record, as the record did not show that the district court "based the 
sentence on Baker's entry of an Alford plea per se." (Resp. Br. p.7.) The State asserts 
that "[t]he Baker analysis applies here." (Resp. Br. p.7.) But in Baker, the reason the 
Court concluded that the district court did not base its sentence on the defendant's 
Alford plea per se was the district court's consistent comments about Baker's lack of 
acceptance of responsibility "and callous attitude about his offenses which made him a 
danger to the public." Baker, 153 Idaho at 696. Mr. Baker's unwillingness to accept 
responsibility was not only evidenced by his Alford plea but by the comments he made. 
For example, the Court of Appeals specifically considered the fact that Baker waited 
until the day his trial was supposed to start and then decided to plead guilty. But even 
when he did so, he was "unwilling to admit he touched the victim's breasts, thereby 
committing sexual battery." Id. Further, the Court noted that, in Baker's PSI, he said "I 
think sometimes the girls in these cases should be held accountable. I never forced 
anything." Id. at 697. 
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Mr. Goetsch made no such comments. He never denied anything. In fact, when 
he was initially confronted by Officer Clayton regarding the complaint, he immediately 
admitted that he touched the victim. His story never changed. He considered going to 
trial, but he decided against it. He considered a trial strategy, but he decided against it. 
And the only reason the district court even knew about that strategy was that it required 
Mr. Goetsch's initial public defender to file a detailed affidavit explaining why she had a 
conflict of interest.3 (See p.3 of App. Br.) Mr. Goetsch gave the district court no reason 
3 Arguably, the district court should never have requested the affidavit. 
Ms. DePew's motion to appoint conflict counsel stated that "during a conference 
regarding the defendant's case and possible trial strategies, it became clear to counsel 
that the defense which the defendant wishes to proffer in this matter places counsel in 
an absolute and unavoidable conflict of interest due to her representation of other 
defendants." (R., pp.59-60.) The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that a "trial court 
may appoint substitute counsel for an indigent defendant upon a showing of good 
cause." State v. Grant, 154 Idaho 281, 285 (2013) (citing State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 
694, 702 (2009)). And, "[t]he onus is on the attorney seeking withdrawal to present 
sufficient facts to support his motion." Id. (citing Frazier v. State, 15 S.W.3d 263, 265-
66 (Tex.App.2000)). In Grant, the attorney argued that substitute counsel should be 
appointed because his client "insisted on rejecting a plea deal," and "their relationship 
had become strained." Id. The Court explained that "neither is an adequate ground for 
withdrawal." Id. In other words, the attorney was not able to show good cause. But the 
Idaho Court of Appeals has stated that "[g]ood cause includes an actual conflict of 
interest. ... " State v. Lippert, 152 Idaho 884, 887 (Ct. App. 2012). Here, Ms. DePew's 
motion alone presented sufficient facts to show an actual conflict of interest. Also, 
Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9 states that "[a] lawyer who has formerly 
represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the 
same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially 
adverse to the interests of the former client. ... " In regards to such a situation where 
the attorney must withdraw, Comment [3] of IRPC Rule 1.16 states, "[w]hen a lawyer 
has been appointed to represent a client, withdrawal ordinarily requires approval of the 
appointing authority." But the next two sentences speak to the issue here. "The court 
may request an explanation for the withdrawal, while the lawyer may be bound to keep 
confidential the facts that would constitute such an explanation. The lawyer's statement 
that professional considerations require termination of the representation ordinarily 
should be accepted as sufficient." Nonetheless, the district court required a pretrial 
conference to discuss the issue further and then still required an affidavit. Between the 
motion for appointment of conflict counsel and the discussion at the pretrial conference, 
it appears that Ms. DePew showed good cause for the appointment of conflict counsel. 
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to doubt that he was accepting responsibility when he pied guilty. The district court 
asked him why he was guilty of sexual abuse and he said "[b]ecause I put my hand up 
underneath her shirt and rubbed her pelvic area, Your Honor." (Tr. 4/9/12, p.19, Ls.18-
22.) The district court asked if that was "in the area of her genitals," and Mr. Goetsch 
replied "Yes, sir." (Tr. 4/9/12, p.19, Ls.23-25.) Again, given that the district court never 
expressed any concern that Mr. Goetsch was not accepting responsibility, the error 
here, unlike in Baker, is plain and obvious from the record. 
C. Mr. Goetsch's Exercise Of His Right To Conflict-Free Counsel Affected The 
Outcome Of The Proceedings, Because The Simple Fact That The District Court 
Considered Other Factors Does Not Prove That Considering The Affidavit Was 
Harmless 
The State argues that because the district court "addressed several 
considerations in imposing Goetsch's sentence," considering his exercise of a 
constitutional right as an aggravating factor did not affect the outcome of the case. 
(Resp. Br. p.10.) Of course, as with almost any sentencing proceeding, the district court 
here discussed the Toohi/1 factors and I.C. § 19-2521. And thus the State concludes 
that the third prong of the fundamental error analysis cannot be met. If this is indeed 
the standard, then a district court could discuss and consider a myriad of impermissible 
sentencing factors as long as it eventually came back around to discussing the 
At this point, no further disclosure of the details of the case strategy should have been 
required. While the motion was eventually granted, filing the affidavit forced Ms. DePew 
to reveal confidential facts regarding a potential trial strategy that the district court later 
used against Mr. Goetsch at sentencing. (See Tr. 6/25/12, p.41, Ls.4-9.) This issue 
would have been raised on appeal if Appellant's motion to augment had been granted. 
(See Motion to Augment and Suspend, filed 3/5/14.) 
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protection of society and retribution and so on. This standard would set such a high bar 
that fundamental error would be impossible to establish. 
The State also asserts that the district court's comment about the fact that 
Mr. Goetsch's exercise of his constitutional right cost the county more money did not 
affect the outcome of the case because it was "just one among several bases for 
Goetsch's sentence." (Resp. Br. p.9.) The State then says that Idaho courts can 
consider the cost of a defendant's public defense, and order its reimbursement. (Resp. 
Br. p.9.) This is misleading. It is clear that the district court was not considering 
reimbursement here; the reference to cost of counsel was made when discussing 
sentencing factors, not when the court spoke about fines, reimbursement, and 
restitution. (See Tr., p.41, Ls.10-13, p.42, Ls.1-25.) The district court clearly stated "the 
defense of this crime has resulted in the additional cost to the country. That is a factor . 
. . for the court to consider." (Tr., 6/25/12, p.41, Ls.10-13.) There is nothing about 
reimbursement in that statement. 
While the appellate court applies a "totality of the circumstances" approach in 
considering certain remarks, vindictiveness is a different matter. See Baker, 153 Idaho 
at 695 (citing State v. Regester, 106 Idaho 296, 300 (Ct. App.1984 )). In Regester, the 
Court said that "we recognize that vindictiveness is a more subtle, narrow question. It 
focuses upon the sentencing judge's view of the defendant's decision to plead not 
guilty. That view cannot be determined upon a single remark removed from context. 
The judge's words and actions must be considered as a whole." Regester, 106 Idaho at 
300 (emphasis added). In this case of course, such a focus is on the sentencing 
judge's view of Mr. Goetsch's exercise of his right to conflict-free counsel. And, again, 
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unlike in Baker, the district court here did not tie Mr. Goetsch's exercise of his 
constitutional right to a lack of acceptance of responsibility or state that such an 
exercise indicated that Mr. Goetsch posed a greater danger to the public. Thus the use 
and portrayal of the sealed document indicated that the sentencing judge had a 
negative view of Mr. Goetsch's actions prior to his plea and sentencing. As stated in his 
Appellant's Brief, "[e]very client has a right to consult with his attorney about his options 
prior to a final decision as to whether to accept a plea offer or go to trial." (App. Br. 
p.13.) When this sort of planning is used against a defendant later, as a result of 
considering the content of a document filed under seal for an unrelated purpose, it is not 
only a violation of due process but potentially a violation of the attorney/client privilege. 
Using it in this way shows that the district court took a negative view of 
Mr. Goetsch's discussions with his attorney. And the district court's comments, even 
taken in context with the fact that it discussed other sentencing factors, show that it 
considered his consultations and discussions of potential trial strategy as aggravating, 
and this permeated the proceeding. Therefore, the error was not harmless because it 
affected the outcome of the sentencing hearing, and the fundamental error is clear. 
11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Considered. As A Factor In 
Sentencing, Mr. Goetsch's Exercise Of His Constitutional Right To Conflict-Free 
Counsel Which Cost The County Additional Money 
A. Introduction 
The State argues it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to use the 
cost of Mr. Goetsch's pursuit of his right to conflict-free counsel as a sentencing factor. 
But it was not a factor the district court was allowed to consider. Regarding the 
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assertion by the State that this argument was waived for a lack of authority, counsel, in 
its Appellant's Brief, should have referred the Court to the authority in Section I of that 
brief and hereby does so. ( See Resp. Br. pp.10-11.) 
8. The District Court's Consideration Of The Extra Cost To The County Was An 
Abuse of Discretion Because It Violated Fundamental Principles Of Due Process 
And Equal Protection 
The State asserts, once again, that because of the district court's "careful 
consideration of the objectives of criminal punishment" there was no abuse of discretion 
when the district court considered, as a sentencing factor, the fact that Mr. Goetsch's 
exercise of his right to conflict-free counsel "resulted in additional cost to the county." 
(Resp. Br. p.11; Tr. 6/25/13, p.41, Ls.10-13.) Despite this clear statement that the 
district court considered something not mentioned in either Toohi/1 or I.C. § 19-2521, 
something that can only be considered for the purpose of reimbursement, the State 
asserts that "the record demonstrates the district court's sentence was consistent with 
applicable law, and imposed through an exercise of reason." (Resp. Br. p.11.) The 
United States Supreme Court has made it clear that punishing a defendant for 
"exercising a protected statutory or constitutional right" is a violation of due process. 
United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 (1982). The law plainly allowed 
Mr. Goetsch to exercise his right to conflict-free counsel. Additionally, punishing an 
indigent defendant for exercising his right to conflict-free counsel raises equal protection 
issues. See Griffin v. //Jinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16-17 (1956). Mr. Goetsch was an indigent 
defendant. In short, the district court did not act within its discretionary scope when it 
considered the cost of his rights as an aggravating factor and therefore abused its 
discretion. Failure to adhere to the applicable legal standards is an abuse of discretion. 
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Indeed, this situation is analogous to a court allowing inadmissible evidence. 
e.g. State v. Watkins, 148 Idaho 418 (2009). There, the judge admitted hearsay 
testimony, and the Idaho Supreme Court found that the "district court abused its judicial 
discretion when it admitted" the testimony because "the district court failed to act 
consistently with the applicable legal standards provided by the rules of evidence." Id. 
at 427. Here, as stated in Mr. Goetsch's Appellant's Brief, the district court abused its 
discretion when it considered the fact that it cost the county extra money when he 
exercised his right to conflict-free counsel because considering such a factor was not 
within the boundaries of the district court's discretion, and thus the district court did not 
act consistently with applicable legal standards. Again, simply because the district court 
considers the protection of society and other proper factors does not mean it can 
consider factors outside the established realm of the objectives of criminal punishment. 
That is exactly what happened here, and therefore the district court abused its 
discretion. 
111. 
In Light Of The Affidavit From Jenny Bateman That Directly Addressed And Discredited 
A Factor That The District Court Improperly Considered At Sentencing. The District 
Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Goetsch's Rule 35 Motion 
A Introduction 
The State asserts that the district court's denial of Mr. Goetsch's Rule 35 was 
correct because there can be only one interpretation of the relationship between the two 
affidavits - one must be true and one must be false. This perspective completely 
misses the point. Read carefully, the relationship between the two documents 
highlights the fact that the district court misunderstood the reason for Ms. DePew's 
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withdrawal from the beginning because Mr. Goetsch was never trying to blame anyone 
else for committing his offense. Further, the State argues that even if the district court 
misinterpreted Mr. Goetsch's strategy, the affidavits still show that Mr. Goetsch was 
denying responsibility. But these arguments simply underscore the fact that the 
contents of the sealed affidavit should not have been used at sentencing. Mr. Goetsch 
never pursued the strategy, and punishing him for considering it was an abuse of 
discretion. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Goetsch's Rule 35 
Motion Because The Affidavit Never Should Have Been Considered In The First 
Place, And The District Court Misunderstood The Potential Trial Strategy In 
Ms. DePew's Affidavit 
The State argues that Mr. Goetsch failed to prove the district court abused its 
discretion when it denied his Rule 35 because the district court rejected the Bateman 
affidavit as false and "both affidavits demonstrate Goetsch's denial of responsibility." 
First of all, the district court could have solved the due process issue that resulted from 
considering the sealed affidavit in the first place by granting Rule 35 relief. Instead, it 
defended its actions, and in doing so, demonstrated that it did not understand the trial 
strategy that Mr. Goetsch considered but ultimately abandoned. 
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the 
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which 
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 
125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994 ). 'The criteria for examining rulings denying the 
requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original 
sentence was reasonable." Id. "If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced, 
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the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional 
information presented with the motion for reduction." Id. 
The Respondent's brief correctly points out that, under Kesling, an appellate 
court will "defer to the trial court's findings of fact . . . unless those findings are 
unsupported by substantial and competent evidence in the record and are therefore 
clearly erroneous." (Resp. Br. p.13; State v. Kesling, 153 Idaho 673, _ (Ct. App. 
2013)) (citing State v. Duvalt, 131 Idaho 550, 552-53 (1998)) (other citation omitted). 
Here, the district court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous because they were not 
supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
In its brief, the State quotes Ms. DePew's affidavit. The affidavit described when 
Ms. Bateman and her private investigator came to her and explained that they believed 
the victim's allegations against Goetsch "were false and stemmed not from the 
defendant's conduct, but rather the alleged rape of the alleged victim by an individual 
who has been a client of counsel's." (DePew Affidavit, p.1; Resp. Br. p.13.) The State 
also quotes Ms. DePew's statement regarding Mr. Goetsch's potential defense strategy 
but omits the most important part of the quote. The State simply quotes the following: 
"[t]he defense which is to be proffered to the Jury involves accusing counsel's former 
client of rape of the alleged victim in the defendant's above-entitled case." (DePew 
Affidavit p.3; Resp. Br. p.13.) But the State leaves off the subsequent, crucial statement 
that should have alerted the district court, and the State, to the fact that Mr. Goetsch 
was not considering blaming someone else for his crime, but considering trying to argue 
that the allegations were false and resulted from the trauma of a completely separate 
crime. That sentence stated "[t]he defense is that the rape by the former client of 
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counsel is what caused the alleged victim in this case to make false a/legations against 
the defendant and that the defendant is not guilty of lewd conduct." (DePew Affidavit 
p.3. (emphasis added).) 
Despite the fact that this sentence even references lewd conduct as the offense 
Mr. Goetsch was accused of, the district court mistakenly concluded that Mr. Goetsch 
was accusing someone else of committing the offense for which he was accused. 
Indeed, the district court said in its Order on the Rule 35 that the Bateman affidavit was 
in "direct conflict" with the DePew affidavit because Ms. Bateman claimed she never 
told Ms. DePew that another person "actually committed the rape for which the 
Defendant was accused." (R., p.137.) 
Mr. Goetsch was never accused of rape, so the district court was obviously 
confused. (App. Br. p.12.) Mr. Goetsch was charged with lewd conduct and sexual 
abuse. (See R., pp.87-90.) There was no penetration of any sort alleged. 
Ms. DePew's affidavit explains that the proposed strategy was to argue that the 
accusations of lewd conduct against Mr. Goetsch were a result of the trauma the victim 
endured as a result of a rape by someone else. In that light, the statements in 
Ms. Bateman's affidavit make perfect sense and certainly do not conflict with the DePew 
affidavit. Ms. Bateman said that she "did not during that conversation ever say or 
insinuate to Ms. DePew that this third person had committed the crime against my 
daughter for which the defendant has pied guilty in this matter." Given the strategy they 
discussed, this was obviously true. 
It is clear that the district court's findings of fact were not supported by substantial 
and competent evidence. Indeed, even though the district court sentenced Mr. Goetsch 
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for sexual abuse, it apparently became confused about the nature of the underlying 
crime when it issued the order on the Rule 35. Thus there was clear error. 
The State then asserts that "'[e]ven if the Court were to find that the district court 
erred in determining that Goetsch's strategy was to blame another for his crime, 
Goetsch cannot show an abuse of discretion" because the DePew affidavit proved that 
Goetsch failed to accept responsibility. (Resp. Br. p.15.) This assertion, along with the 
State's assertions that the DePew affidavit proved Goetsch was trying to shift 
responsibility, and agreed to the appointment of conflict counsel to that end, all depend 
on the premise that the DePew affidavit could have been considered for anything other 
than letting Ms. DePew withdraw. It could not, and, therefore, the district court acted 
outside the boundaries of its discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Goetsch respectfully requests that his case be remanded for a new 
sentencing hearing in front of a different district court. Alternatively, he requests that 
this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate. 
DATED this 21 st day of March, 2014. 
REED P. ANDER 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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